USA v. Alexander Murillo by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-30-2013 
USA v. Alexander Murillo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Alexander Murillo" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 913. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/913 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1221 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALEXANDER MURILLO, 
also known as Alexander Murillo-Barquero, 
  
Alexander Murillo, 
 
                               Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2:09-cr-00816-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. Juan R. Sanchez 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 19, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, CHAGARES, and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 30, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Defendant Alexander Murillo appeals the sentence imposed upon him by the 
District Court, arguing that the court improperly applied the advisory United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) provision for assault with intent to commit 
2 
 
murder and attempted murder.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment 
of sentence entered by the District Court.   
I. 
We write solely for the benefit of the parties and recite only those facts essential to 
our disposition.  The charges against Murillo arose from an incident that occurred on 
New Year‟s Eve 2008 into the early morning of January 1, 2009.  Murillo was 
celebrating the new year with his girlfriend and his girlfriend‟s sister at Tom Foolery‟s 
Bar in Philadelphia.  At some point, the three became involved in an altercation.  Murillo 
left the bar and retrieved an AR-15 style rifle from the trunk of his car.  He loaded the 
weapon and fired into the air and then into a crowd of people standing outside the bar, 
injuring two people.  He then drove his car past the front of the bar and fired again.  One 
victim was shot in the back, stomach, and foot.  The other was shot in the back, thigh and 
hip.  Both were hospitalized and one reported permanent injuries.  Murillo maintains that 
he shot into the air the first time and only fired into the crowd once he was in his car and 
driving by the bar. 
 Murillo and his girlfriend fled the scene.  They went to her mother‟s home, 
switched cars, and made their way to New Jersey where they were eventually 
apprehended.  Once in custody, Murillo waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement.  
He explained that the fight inside the bar began when his girlfriend and her sister became 
involved in an altercation with other partygoers and that he stepped in only when a man 
“took a swing” at his girlfriend.  Supplemental Appendix (“Supp. App.”) 45a.  Murillo 
also provided the following description of the first shots fired at the group of people 
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whom he believed were attacking him:  “I ran toward them and I shot, not directly at 
people but toward them.”  Supp. App. 46a.  He also confessed to the second shooting:  
“we drove past the bar and some of the men who were beating me up were standing in 
front of the bar so I stopped and fired at the bar.”  Id.  Murillo estimated that he fired “4 
or 5, 7 at the most” shots the first time and “3 or 4” shots from the car.  Id. 
 The shootings resulted in both state and federal charges.  Murillo was convicted of 
attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, and related offenses in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
1
  On December 17, 2009, a grand jury returned 
an indictment that charged Murillo with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), possession 
of a firearm by a person “illegally or unlawfully in the United States.”  Murillo, who is 
twenty-six years old, originally entered the United States on a six-month visitor‟s visa in 
1996.  He has been undocumented since December 10, 1996.  
 Murillo pled guilty on May 10, 2010.  At his sentencing hearing, held on January 
13, 2012, Murillo objected to the presentence investigation report‟s application of 
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(2), which calls for a base offense level of twenty-seven when a 
defendant commits an assault with the intent to commit murder or attempted murder, and 
argued that U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, which sets the offense level for aggravated assault, should 
apply instead.
2
  Murillo also presented mitigating evidence; he demonstrated progress 
                                              
1
   Murillo‟s appeals from those convictions are currently pending before the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court.   
 
2
   Section 2A2.1 applies to Murillo through several cross-references in the Guidelines.  
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1) addresses possession of a firearm “in connection with the 
commission or attempted commission of another offense” and directs the sentencing 
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while in prison, including completion of his high school degree.  Two individuals, his 
sister and his children‟s grandmother, spoke on his behalf and others submitted letters of 
support.   
The District Court concluded that U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(2)‟s offense level of 27 
applied because Murillo‟s conduct evidenced a specific intent to kill.3  The court added 
four offense levels because a victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, 
U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(b)(1)(A), subtracted two offense levels for acceptance of responsibility, 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), and subtracted another level because Murillo timely notified the 
Government of his intent to plead guilty, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).  The resulting offense 
level of 28, combined with Murillo‟s criminal history category of I, yielded an advisory 
Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months.  After considering the relevant 3553(a) factors, the 
court granted the Government‟s request for an upward variance in light of the seriousness 
of the injuries Murillo inflicted and the fact that Murillo‟s conduct “placed a crowd of 
people — multiple people — at substantial risk of serious injury or . . . death.”  Appendix 
(“App.”) 87.  The court found that an upward variance of two levels was appropriate.  
The new offense level of 30, combined with criminal history category I, yielded an 
                                                                                                                                                  
court to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy).  Section 2X1.1, in turn, 
provides:  “[w]hen an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy is expressly covered by another 
offense guideline section, apply that guideline section.”  U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(c)(1).  That 
led the sentencing court to U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1, which covers assault with intent to commit 
murder and attempted murder.   
 
3
   If the District Court had found premeditation, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(1), which sets a 
base offense level of 33 “if the object of the offense would have constituted first degree 
murder,” would have applied. 
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advisory range of 97 months to 121 months of imprisonment.
4
  Citing, in particular, the 
seriousness of Murillo‟s offense, his possession and use of an assault rifle, the risk posed 
to innocent bystanders, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect the public, the 
District Court sentenced Murillo to 120 months of imprisonment followed by three years 
of supervised release.   
Murillo filed a timely appeal of his sentence.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We review factual findings relevant to the District Court‟s application of the 
Guidelines for clear error and review the District Court‟s interpretation of the Guidelines 
de novo.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).  A district 
court will make factual findings relevant to the application of the Guidelines by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Grier, 475 F.3d at 561.       
Murillo argues the District Court‟s application of  U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(2) to 
calculate his offense level was improper because his conduct did not evidence a specific 
intent to kill.  Instead, Murillo contends, the court should have applied U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, 
which sets the advisory offense level for aggravated assault, because the evidence only 
established recklessness. 
                                              
4
   The court denied the Government‟s request for an upward variance based upon 
Murillo‟s use of an assault rifle.   
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Section 2A2.1 of the Guidelines sets a base offense level of 33 for assault with 
intent to commit murder or attempted murder “if the object of the offense would have 
constituted first degree murder” and a base offense level of 27 otherwise.  U.S.S.G. § 
2A2.1(a).  The section‟s application notes use the federal murder statute to define first 
degree murder.  U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1 App. Note 1 (“„First degree murder‟ means conduct 
that, if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, would constitute first degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111.”).  Section 1111 
provides that “[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought. . . .  Any other murder is murder in the second degree.”  18 U.S.C. § 
1111(a).  An offender commits or attempts second-degree murder if he acts with malice 
aforethought — the specific intent to kill — but not premeditation.  Gov‟t of Virgin 
Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 295 & n.13 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Braxton v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 344, 351 n.* (1991) (explaining that attempted murder requires specific 
intent to kill).   
To determine whether Murillo acted with the specific intent to kill, the District 
Court looked to United States v. Wilson, 992 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), a 
case with similar facts in which the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
district court‟s application of U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1.  In Wilson, the defendant described his 
conduct in the following way:  “Ernest yelled shoot and Nick shoot and I shoot in the air 
cause I was scared to shoot those people.  Cause they didn‟t do nothing to me.”  Id. at 
157-58.  The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found more than intent to kill; the 
court affirmed the district court‟s conclusion that, when “Wilson fired a shotgun out of 
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the passenger‟s window of the car towards a group of people,” he acted with 
premeditation and deliberation.  Id. at 158-59. 
 Murillo contends that Wilson is distinguishable because the defendant in that case 
was not under stress and therefore retained the ability to premeditate and deliberate 
before firing shots.  Even accepting Murillo‟s description of events as a “vicious assault 
by a group of individuals,” Murillo Br. 16, that fight did not deprive Murillo of his ability 
to act with specific intent.  To the contrary, his own account of his conduct establishes 
that he acted with purpose.  After the altercation inside the bar, Murillo went to his car, 
opened his trunk, retrieved his rifle, fired — either into the air or at the crowd in front of 
the bar — got into his car, traveled past the front of the bar, and fired again at the people 
standing in front.  By Murillo‟s own estimation, he fired up to seven shots while outside 
his car and three or four shots while driving by the bar.  We therefore reject the 
suggestion that the District Court‟s finding of specific intent was clearly erroneous.  See 
Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 464, 470-71 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The active employment of 
force, generally to achieve some end, corresponds closely to the concept of intent, not 
recklessness.”).  By Murillo‟s own admission, he elected at least once to fire his assault 
rifle directly at a group of people.  This active employment of force supports the District 
Court‟s conclusion that “[t]he sequence of events . . . are indicative that Murillo engaged 
in a clearly-defined thought process and not merely reckless conduct.”  App. 67.  The 
court properly applied U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1(a)(2).   
III. 
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 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment of 
sentence.   
 
